Research Into Practice

2004

A Double-Edged Sword: A Study of the Impact of External Educational Aid to the Republic of the Marshall Islands

By
Emi Chutaro
Ministry of Education, the Republic of the Marshall Islands

Hilda C. Heine
PREL's Senior Scholar for Freely Associated States Education

INTRODUCTION

Education in the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) relies heavily on external aid, particularly from the U.S. The magnitude of U.S. support for education in RMI is a key factor in rethinking education aid in RMI. The increasing reliance on external aid by the RMI Ministry of Education (MOE) – more than 80% in 2003-2004 (see Figure 1) – has created a system of education that is not sustainable, nor practical and strategic.

FIGURE 1 RMI MOE Source of Funds, FY2003-2004

Source: Data are from Draft Portfolio Budget Statements, 2003-2004. The Ministry of Education Portfolio, by Ministry of Education, 2003, Majuro, Republic of the Marshall Islands: Author. Adapted with permission.

While external aid to RMI has greatly assisted with expanding public school services and increasing access to a larger proportion of the school-age population, RMI has paid a high price for this in low education outputs. First, the continuing reliance on external aid, particularly from the U.S., has reduced the political commitment to and ownership of education that are sorely needed for RMI to move forward and control its own destiny. Second, the inadequate capacity and requisite infrastructures to plan and make informed decisions about external aid have reduced the ability of local people to exert control and influence direction over quality, access, and relevance in their education. Donors’ restrictions through grants and loan conditions, as well as grant processes that are not highly transparent to recipient countries, limit the ability of local people and governments to influence aid in ways that would maximize benefits for them. This has created a vacuum within both MOE and government leadership where outside forces have increasingly exercised control over direction of education, a situation that is likely to intensify.

Several key characteristics of development within RMI’s history have largely shaped the consciousness of the Marshallese people. First, a displaced society has been created within the social fabric of the islands that has come to be economically and socially dependent on aid to some degree. Second, a consequence of being displaced is often a victim mentality: a general attitude among the displaced people is that the U.S. is obligated to care for them. Third, this attitude has translated into a growing dependence on other foreign aid. Fourth, this dependence has created a society whose global economic and political role is undermined by its continued reliance on U.S. grants, assistance, and therefore influence on the overall development of its outlook. Fifth and most importantly, development planning has been largely influenced by outsiders and outside consultancies, rather than local people, and thus has not adequately taken into consideration the culture and the people concerned.

This study, conducted by two Marshallese educators, looks at the issue of educational aid from an insider’s perspective, a rare viewpoint. Yet, both authors are also outsiders in that they are Western educated with views that may or may not truly reflect local perspectives. Nevertheless, attempts were made to ensure that a balanced presentation about external aid is made, both from donors’ and RMI’s perspectives.

This study on educational aid in RMI necessarily includes a brief discussion about broader issues impacting the country as a nation. For example, the historical relationship between the U.S. and RMI under the Compact of Free Association is integral to the overall discussion of educational aid. More than any other factor, that relationship, which continues under the Compact agreements, has shaped RMI as a country, as well as the people, Ri Majol, today.

This study explores the following aspects of educational aid in RMI:

• The underlying issues and national contexts affecting education;
• The latest statistics on education indicators and challenges;
• The status of current educational aid in RMI;
• Donors’ grant conditions and requirements;
• The ability of local staff to administer and manage aid;
• An examination of the impact of educational aid;
• Constraints and challenges of educational aid; and
• Lessons learned from educational aid.

This study concludes with a series of recommendations for improvement, which targets both RMI and donor agencies and countries.

NATIONAL CONTEXT

RMI consists of 29 atolls and 5 low islands, with a total area of 180 square kilometers (see Figure 2). The islands are scattered over 2 million square kilometers of ocean in the Central Pacific, between Hawai‘i and Guam. RMI is geographically part of the Micronesian region.

Like other countries in the Micronesian region, RMI has a long history of occupation and control by foreign powers. Spain claimed the islands in 1686. Germany declared it a protectorate in 1885. A period of Japanese occupation followed between the two world wars in the early twentieth century until 1945. In 1945, U.S. forces defeated Japanese forces and effectively ended the Japanese occupation. In 1947, a United Nations (UN) mandate was approved that allowed the U.S. to govern and administer the Micronesian region, including RMI, as part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI). The TTPI period lasted about 40 years. As a strategic trust, the islands in the Micronesian region were declared essential for the security of the U.S., a fact that is fundamental to the Compact of Free Association agreements between the U.S. and each of the Freely Associated States (FAS) nations of RMI, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), and Palau.

FIGURE 2 Map of RMI

Reprinted from The Pacific Islands: Politics, Economics, and International Relations (p. 126), by T.I.J. Fairbairn, C.E. Morrison, R.W. Baker, and S.A. Groves, 1991, Honolulu, HI: East-West Center International Relations Program. With permission from the East-West Center's International Relations and Pacific Islands Development programs.

During the first 15 years of U.S. administration, the Micronesian region was economically, socially, and politically ignored until the onset of the Cold War when the area was felt to be “essential to the United States for security reasons” (U.S. Government Survey Mission to the TTPI, 1961, p. S2). During the same period, access to the region was restricted to allow the U.S. to conduct its nuclear testing program without outside interference.

From 1946-1955, the U.S. military conducted the largest aboveground nuclear detonations in the world on Bikini and Enewetak Atolls in RMI. The infamous Bravo test series, conducted in 1954 on Bikini Atoll, obliterated several islets within the atoll chain and largely shaped the love-hate relationship between the U.S. and RMI. The Bravo test also left nuclear fallout on the island itself, as well as on four other atolls affected by the shift in wind direction on that day. As a result, people from these other islands have experienced significant health complications and deaths due to radiation poisoning. To this day, they have the largest concentration of congenital deformities and cancers, such as thyroid cancer and leukemia, in the Pacific region.

Because of the level of radiation on Bikini Atoll, residents had to be relocated to other islands in RMI. After being relocated three times, the Bikinians were finally settled on Kili Island, a single island in the southern part of RMI. As Marshallese identity is linked to land rights, the dislocation of Bikinians has negatively affected their identity – physically, socially, emotionally, and economically. Consequently, a section of the RMI population is not able to function as it did before the nuclear tests.

During the 1960s, the U.S. was also forced to give more attention to the region because “time is running out for the United States in the sense that [it] may soon be the only nation left administering a trust territory” (U.S. Government Survey Mission to the TTPI, 1961, p. S2). In recognition of the problem, President Kennedy approved NSAM No. 145 in April 1962, which set forth as United States policy the movement of Micronesia into a permanent relationship with the United States within our political framework. In keeping with that goal, the memorandum called for accelerated development of the area to bring its political, economic, and social standards into line with an eventual permanent association. The memorandum also established a task force to consider what action might be taken to accomplish our goal and to provide policy and program advice to the Secretary of the Interior, who was responsible for the administration of the Trust Territory (U.S. Government Survey Mission to the TTPI, 1961, pp. S2-S3).

The history of education in RMI during the time span of U.S. Trust Territory administration can be divided into two periods. The first period, extending from 1945-1962, was a time of growth in public elementary schools. Schools were staffed by Marshallese and supported financially by the local communities and district legislature. Teaching was carried out in the local language, and the few materials schools had were translated from U.S. texts. The one high school that served the entire region of Micronesia was located in Chuuk and later in Pohnpei.

During the second period starting in 1962, educational development was accelerated with massive input of federal education money to the Trust Territory government, including RMI. English texts were purchased for elementary and secondary schools, a teacher training fund was provided, and school buildings were constructed. Between 1962 and 1965, as many as 522 new elementary classrooms and 246 houses for American teachers were built across Micronesia (Thomas & Neville, 1984, p. 82). With American teachers brought in, a new emphasis on teaching and learning English took over. The schools became an kien or government properties, not community institutions. This massive infusion of U.S. resources replaced local ownership of schools and created the current dependency on the U.S. for education.

With a long-term goal to closely link the region to the U.S. as a buffer for military purposes, the region and the people had little chance for full independence and sovereignty. While Marshallese leaders advocated complete independence, they also realized in the 1970s that their people, after 30 years of dependence on the U.S. government’s deliberate largesse, were already accustomed to U.S. material wealth and were not ready to give that up for subsistence living. It is no surprise that the Compact of Free Association – considered by some as the final instrument of subjugation for the Marshallese people – was ratified by a slim majority (58%) of the Marshallese people and became effective in 1986.

Compact of Free Association

Since it came into effect in 1986, the Compact of Free Association has been a dominating force in the economic and social life of RMI as a nation. The impact of the Compact is felt by every individual and every family, not only through direct government services, but also through (1) nuclear compensations for wrongful actions by the U.S. resulting in loss of lands, dislocation of people, and nuclear-related illnesses and deaths; (2) military use rental payments; and (3) remittances from families that have migrated overseas under immigration provisions of the Compact. In other words, the Compact has become an integral part of Marshallese lives.

The Compact is best understood as a contract, under which a sovereign RMI sells certain rights and protections to the U.S. in consideration of specific undertakings by the U.S. government. As a condition of this consent, the U.S. acquires the rights to exercise strategic denial, excluding other countries from carrying out military activities in RMI. In return, the U.S. undertakes to defend RMI as the U.S. and its citizens are defended and to make specific payments to RMI under the Compact and separate agreements.

The Compact can be seen as a double-edged sword. It has many advantages as well as disadvantages. One of the advantages is that it allows RMI to develop into a free and fairly modern, self-governing nation. The cost of that freedom, however, is the establishment of a seemingly permanent dependency upon the U.S. Another advantage of the Compact lies in its immigration provision, which has enabled many families to benefit from U.S. educational and economic opportunities. The mass migration from RMI, however, has meant a loss of human resources for the country, resulting to a certain degree in the classic “brain drain.” Back and forth immigration has also had a potentially devastating effect on the Marshallese language and culture. Many young people who grew up in the U.S. have largely lost their linguistic and social ties to RMI, while simultaneously being introduced to Western concepts and habits.

The Compact allows RMI to become a self-governing nation, but one that is economically supported by and essentially dependent for the foreseeable future on U.S. Compact funds (or funds provided to the RMI government by the U.S. under provisions of the Compact) and U.S. federal program funds, primarily in education and health areas. These account for two-thirds of the national budget and make the government solvent. This has created a situation whereby many Marshallese feel that without U.S. assistance, they will be unable to lead the lifestyle to which they have become accustomed.

As more people migrate to and new generations are born and raised in the U.S., the U.S. comes closer to realizing its dream of annexing the islands for the security buffer it needs. For who among these future generations will push for an independent RMI?

This curious partnership of two unequal entities will be further tested when the new Compact (Compact II) takes effect for a 20-year period, as is expected in October 2003. While the economic provisions of the Compact are set out in shorter terms, the Compact itself, including the strategic denial right, continues in perpetuity.

Culture

The Marshallese are a homogeneous people who speak one language, Marshallese. The society is matrilineal, which means that land rights, clans (jowi), and lineage (bwij) are inherited through the maternal side of the family. Extended families, in close-knit communities, occupy pieces of land (weto) and live in subsistence economies with inheritance rights belonging to the clan. There are two classes of people: the royalty (irooj) and the kajoor, which is subdivided into landlords (alap) and workers (dri jerbal). The characteristics of these classes of people are closely linked to the land, where, in the Marshallese culture, one’s identity emerges. The extended family provides for the educational, economic, and social needs of its members, a practice that originates from earlier times when education was a family endeavor.

The culture, like other aspects of the Marshallese society, has been impacted by the introduction of Western concepts (e.g., democracy and free enterprise) and practices (e.g., nuclear family, education). The Compact relationship has also contributed to the cultural and linguistic erosion currently experienced by the Marshallese. New economic enterprises have added to the gaps between rich and poor; and as more people engage in the free market enterprise, the sense of communal undertakings and reciprocal responsibilities weakens.

Demographies

The population of RMI is estimated at 50,840, with a population profile that is relatively young. The annual growth rate is estimated at 1.5%, with a fertility rate of 5.71. The median age is 17.8 years with 55% of the population composed of those 15 years and under. The socioeconomic impact of this bottom-heavy population profile will have major implications for health, education, and employment service provision within the next couple of decades, when these young people mature and produce families of their own (RMI Office of Planning and Statistics, 1999). Life expectancies have improved slightly from the 1988 figures of 59.6 for males and 62.6 years for females to the 1999 figures of 65.7 and 69.4, respectively (Economic Policy, Planning and Statistics Office, 2001).

Majuro Atoll, the capital of RMI, is the largest population center with 23,676 people; Kwajalein Atoll (Ebeye Island) is the next largest with 10,902 people. For Majuro alone, the population density is 3,200 persons per square mile, primarily concentrated in the Darrit-Uliga-Delap section of Majuro. On Ebeye, the population density is 66,750 persons per square mile (RMI Office of Planning and Statistics, 1999). These two urban centers combined constitute 70% of the total RMI population.

The remainder of the population is spread over a large area in the rural outer islands. The geographic isolation of these islands has posed a significant barrier for the government to overcome in implementing development strategies evenly. The issue of access is a key problem for the outer islands in all respects, including education, food and clothing, electricity, running water, sanitation facilities, and transportation. Out of the 29 inhabited atolls and islands, only 4 have sources of electricity.

Economic Overview

With a limited land base, RMI has very limited resources. Copra, the main source of income for the outer island population, has seen decreasing prices in recent years because of the worldwide price of coconut oil. Sources of income from marine life are still being explored, with the growth and sale of black pearls the most promising source of revenue to date.

Therefore, the economy is largely dependent upon and dictated by U.S. funding. As stated earlier, the Compact sets forth a unique relationship between RMI and the U.S., where financial and other assistance is given in exchange for certain defense-related benefits. In terms of the national budget, U.S. federal grants and aid packages, on average, accounted for 45% of the overall budget revenue for RMI during the first Compact period, 1987-2003. Other foreign grants account for, on average, another 13%, resulting in an average total of 58% of the national budget revenue coming from foreign grants and assistance (Asian Development Bank [ADB], 2001, p. 22).

Current Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is estimated at $1,900. Though 50% higher than in the mid-1980s, when adjusted in real terms this amount is approximately the same as in 1987-1988 (ADB, 2001, p. 18). Overall, despite the heavy influx of U.S. and other foreign aid, grants, and rental payments, sustainable development has not been achieved in RMI. This is largely due to the fact that national and local mechanisms of management and implementation have not been appropriately developed in conjunction with the actual needs and requirements of RMI. It is also due to a limited capacity within the government ministries and local communities to fully appreciate these foreign mechanisms, limiting their ability to develop relevant policies and strategies that will ensure positive production and growth outputs, as well as support local entrepreneurial initiatives.

Financial provisions of Compact II, which replaced financial provisions of the first Compact on September 30, 2003, will determine the financial future and, in many ways, the economy of RMI. While there is a lot of talk on the part of the U.S. about accountability, the proposed funding levels for a 20-year term fall far short of what the country needs to improve basic services to people, including education. In addition, accountability works both ways. There are many Marshallese who believe that the U.S. has not been accountable for past wrongs committed against the Marshallese people.

In regard to the overall outlook of the RMI economy, several key factors have had significant impact on its sustainability. First is the government’s inability to appropriately develop and implement strategic policies regarding economic development. Second is the government’s inability to incorporate the local communities in the development process and to give them opportunities to participate in and monitor development projects. Third, the level of private sector growth is often limited by the lack of a local skilled human resource base to sustain private sector initiatives. The result is that many companies have to hire expensive expatriate workers in order to fill key administrative and skilled positions. And last, the formal and non-formal education system is not providing adequate and quality skills training opportunities to those of employable age, further compounding the problem of the lack of a skilled human resource base to support overall economic growth.

Employment

The employment sector reflects the poor level of economic growth within RMI. In terms of the labor market, employment opportunities occur primarily in the public service sector. Private sector growth in terms of industrial development and availability of new employment opportunities has remained stagnant in the last decade.

Currently, the total unemployment rate is 30.9%, one of the highest in the Pacific region. The male unemployment rate is 27.6%; the female unemployment rate is higher at 37.3%; the youth unemployment rate (ages 15-19) is even higher at 55% (RMI Office of Planning and Statistics, 2002).

It appears that the negative employment profile of RMI is impacted from several fronts. On one hand, the education system does not produce the basic skills required to support private sector and overall development growth. On the other hand, there are few opportunities to provide training in particular skills outside of the formal school system. As a result, many Marshallese of employable age simply do not have the skills to find productive employment. Jobs requiring specialized skills are primarily occupied by outsiders, who are often actively recruited by many of the larger companies within RMI.

EDUCATION SYSTEM

Given the national context of a young population, limited resources, high unemployment rates, and an economy largely dependent on the U.S., the role of the MOE becomes a highly significant one.

Established in 1981 under the RMI constitutional government, the MOE is set up to carry out the constitutional mandates to provide education and other services to its citizens as stipulated in the RMI Constitution, Article II, Section 17. Furthermore, the RMI Nitijela, or Parliament, through the RMI Government’s Public Law 1991-125 (1991), declares and recognizes people’s rights to education and the government’s responsibilities to provide it and to set directions and standards for how it should be carried out. Public Law 1991-125 specifies:

• The right of the people to education and the obligation of the Government to take every step reasonable and necessary to provide these services, consistent with Article II, Section 17 of the Constitution;
• The Cabinet’s responsibility for establishing and maintaining schools and for making such other provision as may be reasonable and necessary to provide educational opportunities for the people of the Marshall Islands, consistent with Article V, Section 1(3)(h) of the Constitution;
• The need to encourage citizen involvement in educational matters providing for schools that guarantee and support local participation consistent with the goal of a thorough and efficient system of education serving all of the children of the Republic; and
• That the goal of education in the Republic shall be to foster self-reliance, and that all educational programs and curricula be structured to further this goal. (p. 1)

The Education Act, which repealed the Trust Territory codes, mandates education for all children ages 6-14. The act also provides for creation of a National Education Board, an advisory body to the minister and the secretary of education, and local boards of education to be established within each local government jurisdiction. While the Education Act recognizes the importance and active involvement of these boards for grassroots-level participation and involvement in the education process, they have yet to become fully functioning parts of the education environment in RMI. Thus, participation in and ownership of the education process by grassroots people remains a distant dream, albeit a crucial one.

In addition to the Education Act, two other public laws set policy contexts for education in RMI: the College of the Marshall Islands (CMI) Act of 1990, which establishes the CMI as the RMI public institution for postsecondary and adult education programs, and the Industries Development Act of 1982, amended in 1991, which legislates skills training and vocational education and establishes the Alien Workers’ Fund, which levies a tax on alien workers’ wages to be put toward a training fund.

In addition to this legislation, the education policy environment in RMI is influenced by various cabinet policies enacted from time to time.

Elementary and Secondary Education

The MOE carried forward a system of education established by its predecessor, the Department of Education, which administered education in RMI under the TTPI government. The MOE is divided into four bureaus: curriculum and instruction, administration and budget, facilities and logistics, and planning and research. An assistant secretary heads each of the four bureaus and reports directly to the secretary of education. The minister of education is a member of the cabinet, appointed by the president from among senators elected to the Nitijela.

The present structure of the education system is based on the U.S. model of eight years of elementary followed by four years of secondary education. In school year (SY) 2003-2004, kindergarten classes will begin in some of the public schools. As shown in Table 1, there are 49 Head Start centers, 78 public elementary and secondary schools, and 39 private elementary and secondary schools. Of the 16 secondary schools, 3 are public and 13 are private.

Early childhood education is provided almost exclusively through Head Start, a U.S. federally funded program for which RMI receives $3 million annually. Federal guidelines mandate that not more than 1,260 children ages 3-5 can be served by this grant. This translates to 20% of the eligible school-age population. Some private schools also provide early childhood education at preschool and kindergarten levels to those who can afford their tuition.

The school enrollment profile for RMI students for SY 2002-2003 is shown in Table 1. Although basic education is mandated, public school facilities, teachers, and other resources are inadequate to meet that mandate. Education for youth ages 15 and older is not compulsory in RMI. Consequently, secondary education is provided to only 42.2% of the high school age population through three public high schools and a number of private high schools.

Unlike other places in the Pacific, private schools play an important role in filling the gap in student enrollment, particularly at the secondary level. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the share of enrollment in public and private schools. The RMI government encourages that significant role by providing a private school subsidy as a line item in its annual budget. As many as 70% of grade 8 students who cannot be accommodated at the public high schools find spaces in the private high schools (MOE, 2003b).

TABLE 1
School Enrollment for SY 2002-22003

FIGURE 3 Elementary Enrollment, SY 2002-2003

Source: Data are from Education for All: Republic of the Marshall Islands National Action Plan, 2002-2005, by Ministry of Education, 2003, Majuro, Republic of the Marshall Islands: Author. Adapted with Permission.

Trends over the last five years (see Table 2) show a slight decline in overall enrollment, perhaps because of the slight decrease in the population growth rate and steady migration out of the country. Total elementary enrollments have decreased annually from SY 1998-1999 to its lowest in SY 2002-2003. Over the same five-year period, enrollments in secondary schools have increased by about 500, with the public and private sectors sharing this growth roughly equally.

FIGURE 4 Secondary Enrollment, SY 2002-2003

Source: Data are from Education for All: Republic of the Marshall Islands National Action Plan, 2002-2005, by Ministry of Education, 2003, Majuro, Republic of the Marshall Islands: Author. Adapted with Permission.

Enrollment Trends in Elementary and Secondary,
SY 1998-1999 to 2002-2003

TABLE 3
Attrition Rates by Percentage for RMI Schools,
SY 1999-2000 to 2002-2003

As indicated in Table 3, the majority of RMI students do not reach grade 12. Although this rate has improved slightly from SY 1999-2000 to 2002-2003, the number remains alarming. Several factors account for this high percentage. First, the legal mandatory attendance requirement for children ages 6-14 is not enforced. Consequently, many students begin school but, for various reasons, stop going before the age of 14. Second, there is a loss of students, 27.4% in SY 2002-2003, in the transition to high school. The MOE (2003b) describes this as “push out” rather than “drop out” since students are literally pushed out of school due to the shortage of space. Still, this is an improvement over previous years when the rate of “push out” between grades 8 and 9 was 30% and above.

TABLE 3
Attrition Rates by Percentage for RMI Schools,
SY 1999-2000 to 2002-2003

In addition to the dropout rates, there is growing concern that many children of elementary school age do not attend school. Figure 5 gives a graphic representation of the RMI school attendance profile for SY 2002-2003: 16% of children ages 6-13 and 30% of youth ages 14-18 did not attend school. Outside of the school-age population, 67.1% of youth age 19-21 years did not attend school of any kind (RMI Office of Planning and Statistics, 2002, p. 11).

As shown in Figure 6, the percentage of elementary school students who complete grade 8 is around 85%. For students who attend enhancement programs to prepare them for the transition to high school, the completion rate is lower (around 75%). The completion rate for high school students currently stands at 60%.

Overcrowded schools contribute to the high dropout rates. Many of these schools are found in the urban centers (Majuro and Ebeye), where 28 of the 76 elementary schools are located. The remaining 48 elementary schools are scattered throughout the rural outer islands. Of the 16 secondary schools, 8 are located on Majuro and 5 are located on Kwajalein Atoll (ADB, 2001, p. 53); the other 3 are located in the rural outer islands.

FIGURE 5 RMI School Attendance Profile, SY 2002-2003

Source: Data are from Education for All: Republic of the Marshall Islands National Action Plan, 2002-2005, by Ministry of Education, 2003, Majuro, Republic of the Marshall Islands: Author. Adapted with permission.

FIGURE 6 RMI Students' School Completion Rates

Source: Data are from Education for All: Republic of the Marshall Islands National Action Plan, 2002-2005, by Ministry of Education, 2003, Majuro, Republic of the Marshall Islands: Author. Adapted with permission.

Except for some urban center schools, the majority of RMI public schools have substandard facilities. Library spaces are limited, if they exist at all; access to electricity, running water, telephones, fax machines, photocopiers, or the Internet is simply not there. Most of the outer island schools are multigrade schools, having anywhere from one to six teachers to provide instruction for eight different grade levels. All three public secondary schools have insufficient facilities.

Part of the dilemma of educational aid is that while it is there, it is often not available for the needs of the community that receives it. Thus, while educational aid funds have poured into RMI, facilities construction is often a disallowed activity, leaving the facilities in gross disrepair.

Postsecondary Education

The two postsecondary education institutions, CMI and the University of the South Pacific (USP) Marshall Islands Center, are both located on Majuro. Together, they have improved access to postsecondary education. However, given the level of preparation of RMI students, their services have not been fully realized. A great deal of their limited resources are expended on remedial and developmental services to raise the capacity of students to college-level studies. About one-third of CMI’s student enrollment is in developmental programs (see Table 4).

TABLE 4
CMI Enrollment

Most funding for CMI comes from U.S. federal grants, primarily Pell Grants, which pay for tuition and other student costs. The RMI government contributed approximately $794,000 in fiscal year (FY) 2003, or 20% of the annual operational budget of the college. Furthermore, this allocation comes from Compact-tied funds, not RMI general funds. U.S. federal grants make up the other 80% of the annual budget, approximately $2.8 million. The RMI contribution to the operation of the college is less than half of CMI’s annual budget request to the Nitijela. In the meantime, the Western Association of Schools and Colleges has put the college on probation. Among the factors that contribute to the probationary status is the lack of financial commitment and support from the RMI government.

The USP Marshall Islands Center receives most of its funding from the parent organization, the USP. The RMI government contributes to the pool of funds from which extension center programs receive a share. In addition, the program director has been successful in securing supplemental grants for specialized projects from outside sources including Japanese Grassroots grants, AusAID, and Canada Fund. The center receives outside grants ranging in amounts from $20,000 to $100,000. The center has also had a successful record of utilizing AusAID scholarships, which range from $19,000 to $30,000 per student depending on the course of study (I. Tafaaki, personal communication, September 14, 2003).

Educational Challenges

Educational challenges facing the RMI MOE can be classified under three broad headings: quality, access, and relevance. Educational aid has greatly assisted with the issue of access. However, as will be seen in the following discussion, issues of quality and relevance have been negatively influenced.

Quality. The poor quality of education in RMI is one of the major challenges for the MOE. Access to reliable test data to fully support this statement is unavailable. However, test results from the Pacific Islands Language and Literacy (PILL) test and the Secondary Level English Proficiency Test (SLEPT) have generally been used as the baseline data to measure student performance in RMI. Results from the High School Entrance Test have also been used to gauge the quality of education students are receiving.

PILL, a criterion referenced test first developed in 1993 by the South Pacific Board for Educational Assessment, measures children’s acquisition of language and numeracy skills after four years of formal education. The test consists of five proficiency levels. Most RMI students perform at proficiency levels 1 and 2, which represent at risk students. Figure 7 shows an eight-year span of test results for the RMI grade 4 student population. RMI students are placed in the at risk category at 60%, 50%, and 70% for English, Marshallese, and math, respectively. When compared with test results from across the Pacific, RMI test results are among the lowest. While some improvements are evident, the level of improvement is hardly significant.

Results from SLEPT used by CMI for student placement purposes show that only 22% of those tested were qualified to take English courses for credit. Most students ended up in the “development” course (MOE, 2001, p. 16).

At the core of the issue of quality is the qualification level of the teaching staff throughout RMI. Of RMI teachers, 55% have high school diplomas as their highest educational attainment, while 41% have associate’s degrees, and 4% have bachelor’s degrees. Since a two-year associate’s degree is the teacher certification requirement level, teachers with only high school diplomas do not meet the MOE’s requirements.

Figure 8 provides a clear indication of the general qualification of public school teachers by sector. Hidden in the chart is the high proportion of four-year degree holders who are expatriates.

FIGURE 8 Qualifications of Public Schools Teachers, 2002-2003

Source: Data are from Education for All: Republic of the Marshall Islands National Action Plan, 2002-2005, by the Ministry of Education, 2003, Majuro, Republic of the Marshall Islands: Author. Adapted with permission.

Initiatives in the MOE are aimed at addressing the issue of quality. One of these has been the major endorsement, support, and financing of teacher education and certification programs at CMI. These programs are geared toward both pre- and in-service teachers. This is a long-term effort that, sustained over time, will result in a cadre of fully prepared local teachers. The MOE has stipulated that current teachers who do not meet the current teacher certification level must go through the teacher training program.

Efforts to bring in teachers from the Peace Corps, WorldTeach, Japanese Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV), and other volunteer programs to address the quality of teaching staff are ongoing. The Peace Corps program is expected to reinstate services to RMI in the coming year, and JOCV currently has 23 volunteers in RMI schools. The MOE has also contracted the WorldTeach organization of Harvard University to recruit recent college graduates to teach English in RMI schools. The contract, which provides for housing and transportation to and from Majuro, costs about $250,000. Twenty-three teachers were recruited in SY 2002-2003, the first year of the program. According to MOE sources, improvement in the level of English literacy is already evident.

The MOE has yet to deal substantially with this issue. While the volunteer programs are good, they are only temporary solutions to a long-term problem.

Lack of a strong vocational and life skills oriented education system presents yet another challenge to the quality of education children receive. With academic preparation as the main focus of education, little effort has been made to develop basic occupational skills transferable to the employment sector, whether in RMI or overseas. The education system’s inability to coordinate with and take into consideration the economic aspect of people’s lives has reinforced the irrelevancy of education to the needs and requirements of the Marshallese people and society.

Access. While educational aid has greatly assisted with public school expansion, the problem of access to educational services still remains a challenge. The inequality of and constraints on access to education occur at several levels. First, there is the uneven distribution of services and programs between urban and outer island schools. Many factors impact the ability to ensure even access, but logistics and the availability of resources are primary. The principal input in terms of resources to outer island schools consists of teachers’ salaries. Professional development and support throughout the school year is limited to one or two visits by MOE specialists and mentors. Instructional material, including books and references for teaching, is also inadequate, particularly in outer island communities where teachers are isolated and basically on their own.

Second, the challenge of access is also indicated by limitations in student enrollment at different levels of the educational process. As stated earlier, only 20% of eligible students receive preschool education through the federally funded Head Start program. The vast majority of students begin their education at 1st grade, many of them without appropriate school readiness skills. Approximately 16% of primary-level students do not go to school. Statistics indicate that primary school enrollment is decreasing over time, and it is not clear whether migration is really the cause. Population growth has also been declining, which may account for the lower figures.

Approximately 40-45% of secondary-level students do not attend high school due to lack of space. Furthermore, for outer island high school students, it is often necessary to leave home and board at school or with relatives where public high schools are available. Some students will make the sacrifice to receive a high school diploma; others are not willing or unable to leave home due to family commitments. Access to vocational training programs and to postsecondary education is another constraint for outer island children and youth. Most training programs are offered in the urban centers and draw students from outer islands to the urban centers, further contributing to the migration problems mentioned earlier.

Third, urban migration exacerbates the issue of crowded schools and limited classroom space. The average student-teacher ratio in urban schools remains high, in some cases as high as 1:35/45 students (ADB, 1995, p. 109), while for the outer islands the ratio is rather low, nearly 1:15, and lower in some places. Until very recently, most urban schools ran on a double shift system to accommodate the growing enrollment caused by urban migration.

Relevance. Education, as it was handed down from the TTPI government, has been taken for granted and accepted as appropriate. A discussion about the purpose of education has never taken place internally where Marshallese themselves could critically examine the current structure of education, curriculum content, methods of teacher training, and processes of teaching to ensure they are built on Marshallese values and beliefs. Efforts to examine the purpose of education have always been directed and influenced by outsiders. Hence, the outcomes of these efforts have all fallen short of answering the issue of relevance to the Marshallese themselves.

While the issue of relevance remains unaddressed, challenges with regard to ownership of schools and community and parent involvement continue to constrain improvement efforts. Unlike the church, where ownership and empowerment have solidly taken hold, ownership of the schools and the sense of empowerment that goes with it are notably absent in RMI. For the most part, the attitude that “the school belongs to the government” still prevails. Hence, parents and communities often allow school facilities to deteriorate to a condition of disrepair. The pride in “our” school is absent.

When public schooling was first introduced to Micronesia and communities operated schools, ownership on the part of local communities was strong. Local people in whatever amount they could afford paid the salaries of teachers. At the same time, teaching was done in the vernacular. In the view of outsiders, including the U.N. visiting missions that provided oversight through the years, this practice was seen as “evidence of neglect on the part of the U.S. government rather than as evidence of a wise, humane concern” for the future of the people (Thomas & Neville, 1984, p. 87).

Consequently, schools were literally taken over by the Trust Territory government. U.S. teachers and administrators were brought in, curriculum was modeled after that of U.S. schools, and used and dated textbooks cast aside by wealthier school systems were given to schools in Micronesia, including RMI. Along with the textbooks came Western values and beliefs. English was enforced as the medium of instruction in secondary schools. The schools became foreign to the local people and thus, a feeling of disconnectedness began. This feeling, among many other factors, contributes to the high dropout rates and limited success of Marshallese students.

Parental involvement, a strong component of school improvement efforts, is lacking in most RMI public schools. When the schools were run by the TTPI government, parents were left behind. To this day, parents feel they are irrelevant to the new school systems. The structure is not indigenous, the curriculum is about something else and somewhere else, and most parents feel insignificant to a school where teachers are the experts and they know best. To date, attempts at including parents in schools have met with minimal success.

RMI Funding. Quality and access are being addressed by the RMI MOE in the 2003-2004 budget. Budget allocations by outcomes reveal a greater proportion being allocated toward addressing the issue of access. Outcomes 1, 3, and 5 represent more than 30% of the budget and will assist with increasing student enrollment in preschool and college. The quality of education is being addressed under Outcomes 2 and 4, which make up more than 60% of the budget.

• Outcome 1: Increase preschool enrollment.
• Outcome 2: Improve quality of primary schools.
• Outcome 3: Improve school attendance at primary schools.
• Outcome 4: Improve quality of secondary schools.
• Outcome 5: Increase success rate at college.

Financing of Education

The new approach to budgeting proposed in Compact II is designed to link performance with budget allocations. Clearly, past performance indicates this has been a weak area. This approach, it is hoped, will ensure that specific targets are met within a specific timeframe. When outputs are not achieved, the reasons will be clearer. Furthermore, it is hoped that close U.S. monitoring of budgetary expenditures will lead toward efficient and effective implementation of established goals and objectives.

Two new decision making and management tools in Compact II, the Fiscal Procedure Agreement and the Medium Term Budget and Investment Framework, are designed to ensure that funds are allocated to prioritized target areas of Compact II and, more importantly, that implementation is accountable and transparent to the U.S. and RMI governments. Compact II provides for a Joint Economic Manage-ment and Financial Accountability Committee (JEMFAC), whose function is to provide oversight for performance of Compact-related investment in RMI, including how recurrent monies are spent. JEMFAC will comprise five members, with a representative of the U.S. acting as chair. RMI will appoint two members and the U.S. will appoint the others (including the chair).

Attitudes and beliefs about performance and productivity, including ownership of the issues and the development process, are concepts that will need much nurturing in RMI. These were ignored during the TTPI period, as decisions were made for people. During Compact I years, the Marshallese were beginning to think and make decisions for themselves, and to a certain extent, take control of their destiny. Many of the decisions were wrong decisions, but they were opportunities to learn. These opportunities are being taken away in Compact II.

Currently, funding for RMI education comes from a number of sources: RMI General Fund, Compact-Tied Fund, Special Revenue Fund, U.S. federal grants, and other external grants. Expenditures are classified as recurrent or non-recurrent. In addition to funds that flow through the MOE (see Table 5), other funds in support of education are provided directly to agencies and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from external sources. These are not part of the MOE budget discussed below.

General Fund. Every year, pursuant to Article VIII of the Constitution of the Marshall Islands, locally generated revenues are allocated by the Appropriation Act to different government program areas, including education. The General Fund supports various administrative and monitoring functions of the MOE. Primary and postsecondary schools and programs are supported by this fund. Private schools operating throughout RMI are partly supported through subsidies (Aid to Private Schools).

Compact-Tied Fund. As mandated by Section 221 of Compact I, the RMI government receives an annual appropriation from the U.S. government in the form of a special block grant amounting to $3 million for health and education. Education receives half of this allocation annually. Public secondary schools are supported by these funds. In addition, Section 224 of Compact I annually allocates approximately $797,000 in the form of postsecondary scholarships for eligible RMI citizens to attend U.S.-accredited colleges. Although these funds pass through the MOE, they are operated by a separate scholarship board.

Under Compact I, Compact and general revenue funds were kept separate. The proposed Compact II arrangements would mix these funds, and the MOE would allocate them according to its sectors and divisions as it sees fit. Compact funds generally make up about 17% of the annual education budget. Under Compact II proposals, this percentage is expected to drastically increase to about 50%.

Special Revenue Fund. The National Training Council (NTC), the official coordinating body for all training activities in RMI, secures funding support through the alien workers’ tax imposed on employers of foreign nationals. NTC also receives grant funds from various sources. Although they are funneled through education, the MOE has no control over NTC funds. Student registration fees, at $10 per student in urban schools on Majuro and Ebeye, are also classified as Special Revenue Funds. Annually, the MOE collects and has control over approximately $70,000 in registration fees.

U.S. Federal Grants. In accordance with U.S. Public Law 99-239, RMI receives certain programs and services from the U.S. government. These grants normally have a limited duration and specific spending guidelines and restrictions. The funds currently provide a major source of financing for the MOE. U.S. federal grants make up an average of 37% of the total education budget annually. U.S. federal programs to RMI are discussed in greater detail later in this section.

Other External Grants. Membership in different international organizations affords RMI access to other external funds. These include funds from UN programs such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations Children’s Fund, the United Nations Development Programme, and others. Membership in bilateral and multilateral organizations in recent years has brought eligibility for other sources of external aid from such donor agencies as the European Union (EU) and the ADB. External assistance also includes aid from countries with which RMI has established diplomatic relations, such as Japan, the Republic of China (Taiwan), and Australia, among others. Approximately 10% of the annual education budget comes from these external sources.

As shown in Table 5, RMI has developed an impressive track record of soliciting contributions and assistance from both bilateral and multilateral donors since it gained full independence with the beginning of Compact I in 1986.

TABLE 5
RMI MOE Source of Funds, 2002-2004

In terms of national budgetary allocation, education expenditures from all sources of funds in the last three years average between 17% and 18% of total national expenditures. The allocation to education as a percentage of the national budget has actually increased in recent years. For example, in 1988, the education allocation represented only 10.67% of the GDP (Academy for Educational Development, 1989, p. 35). As Table 5 illustrates, the overall allocation includes recurrent funding from RMI general and Compact-tied funds, U.S. federal funds, non-recurrent capital funds (U.S. and Taiwan), and other foreign assistance. Both recurrent and non-recurrent funds from other donor agencies and countries such as the EU and Taiwan are funneled through the MOE.

Nearly 55% of MOE funding in 2001 came from U.S. financial assistance, either through Compact allocations or U.S. federal grants. This reliance on U.S. funding sources is expected to increase when the U.S. share of the national education budget increases to 72%, as expected in 2003, the first year of Compact II.

The percentage of the RMI budget devoted to education is not dissimilar to other countries’ allocations to the education sector. However, these figures can be misleading because they include funds earmarked for specialized targeted programs and groups (e.g., special education and Head Start programs), restricting their use to a very small percentage of the total student population.

The per pupil expenditure ratio for RMI public school students in FY 2002 is $1,876, based on the total public school enrollment figures in Table 2 and the total funding level, which includes capital account allocations, in Table 5. A slight increase is expected for 2003 when per pupil expenditures will rise to $1,998. Per pupil expenditure has been slowly increasing in the last four years, making it comparable to other independent countries in the Pacific, but much lower than the U.S. flag territories and states.

Allocation of Funds

As with the whole RMI government, the MOE depends heavily on U.S. grants and Compact funds to finance a large part of its recurrent costs. Figure 9 illustrates the average allocation of MOE funds to the various education sectors. The elementary education division receives the bulk of the MOE annual budget, with secondary education receiving the second largest amount. Postsecondary education is being increasingly perceived as essential in today’s economy and, with more support from parents and communities, demands for increased postsecondary funding are becoming louder and more politically motivated.

As shown in Table 6, instructional supplies and materials constitute less than 2% of the 2004 elementary education budget for rural outer island elementary schools, while personnel constitutes more than 70%. Majuro schools fare better with their 5% allocation for supplies and materials. Compact II allocates a $3 million special appropriation for military use of Kwajalein lands, $1.5 million of which goes toward educational improvements in Ebeye. Consequently, Ebeye schools receive, for the first time, an unusually high budget allocation, of which the MOE has earmarked 32% for instructional supplies and materials.

FIGURE 9 Allocation of MOE Budget, 2003-2004

Source: Data are from Draft Portfolio Budget Statements, 2003-2004. The Ministry of Education Portfolio, by Ministry of Education, 2003, Majuro, Republic of the Marshall Islands: Author. Adapted with permission.

The Ebeye case illustrates the inequity with which resources and services are allocated across schools and communities. It also demonstrates how external funds can sometimes contribute, albeit inadvertently, to unequal access to services and resources.

While there is much publicity about increased funds for education under Compact II, when it comes down to what is required to improve education, the increase is still insufficient, particularly to address the needs of outer island schools. As noted above, Ebeye schools appear to be the primary beneficiary in Compact II allocations.

TABLE 6
Elementary Education Budget Breakdown, 2004

Source: Data are from Draft Portfolio Budget Statements, 2003-2004. The Ministry of Education Portfolio, by Ministry of Education, 2003, Majuro, Republic of the Marshall Islands: Author. Adapted with permission.

CURRENT STATUS OF EDUCATIONAL AID IN RMI

Educational assistance to Pacific island nations generally reflects colonial histories in that the U.S. spends more than 91% of its assistance in the Pacific on the three FAS of RMI, FSM, and Palau. At the same time, 75% of Australia’s assistance in the Pacific region went to Papua New Guinea. Multilateral donors like the EU and the ADB also have their preferred recipient countries. More than 65% of EU and more than 50% of ADB assistance go primarily to two countries: Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands (U.S. General Accounting Office [GAO], 2001, p. 5).

Just as historical affiliations influence educational aid, so do beliefs about the region’s economic and social status and capability to sustain improvements initiated by outside assistance. Major aid donors believe that many Pacific island nations (including RMI) will not be able to achieve self-sustainability without continued assistance in the foreseeable future (U.S. GAO, 2001, p. 2). Challenges such as limited natural resources, remote locations, vulnerability to natural disasters, environmental problems, limited institutional capacity, and the impact of climate change are often cited as reasons for lack of self-sustainability. Additionally, rapid urbanization, population growth, and inadequate infrastructure are cited as other challenges that have outstripped countries’ abilities to meet basic health and education needs.

Furthermore, most donors believe that there are trade-offs involved in providing assistance. For example, foreign policy interests might place a different emphasis on the accountability of the aid. In the case of RMI and other FAS nations, U.S. interests in cultivating closer relations with the new Compact countries dictated a relatively relaxed accountability and monitoring of Compact I funds in the first years of the Compacts. Administrative costs, effectiveness, and accountability of the assistance also play a role in deciding appropriate approaches used by donor countries and agencies. Needs of the receiving country are often the least considered factor. This fact remains a primary challenge of educational aid in the Pacific.

It appears that the consideration of effectiveness and efficiency (for the donor country or agency) of educational aid is the overarching criteria for how assistance is provided in the Pacific region. Consequently, major donor countries and agencies have adopted the following strategies for their assistance (U.S. GAO, 2001, pp. 2-3) in the Pacific region:

• Implement projects that improve the governance of recipient countries.
• Use sub-regional approaches to development that tailor aids to individual characteristics of recipient regions.
• Build flexibility into assistance strategies in order to provide incentives for positive achievements or stop assistance to recipients as needed.
• Establish a trust fund to provide recipients with a self-sustaining source of future income.
• Emphasize donor coordination as a tool for improving efficiency by limiting duplication of projects and reducing multiple donor requirements on recipient countries.
• Utilize a sector-wide approach to assistance (new in the Pacific region).

The project oriented approach, one of the most popular strategies employed in the Pacific, often reflects priorities of the donor country or agency, resulting in a fragmented and uncoordinated approach to external aid and local development efforts. Currently, almost all educational assistance to RMI employs this approach.

Although Compact II assistance under Title II provisions attempts to work around the project approach by providing sectoral grants to RMI, U.S. federal grants, if continued under Compact II, are often project oriented and formula-based with a focus determined by U.S. community contexts and needs. Accessing these funds and making them “fit” RMI needs and contexts requires ingenuity and understanding of the U.S. grants system. Current efforts by the MOE to “block grant,” or combine all federal grants into one big U.S. federal grant and include it as part of Compact II, would assist in streamlining administration and allow the MOE to allocate funds based on needs.

External donors’ strategies and priorities have undoubtedly contributed to the lack of a coherent policy for external aid, which has impacted education in RMI. Moreover, despite efforts to develop roadmaps in the form of strategic education plans, goals and strategies are often implemented based on availability of funding rather than on set priorities.

Several education plans were developed over the years to assist the MOE in moving education forward. Despite good intentions, limitations of funding, the need to respond to available educational aid from outside – even though it contributes to low priority areas – and the lack of political will to make meaningful commitments to education on the part of RMI leadership have rendered these plans ineffective. The national education goals of RMI are closely linked to the types of outside-assistance that can be bargained for, not vice versa. As a result, educational gains have not kept pace with the amount of educational aid to RMI.

As far as Pacific states are concerned, RMI is in an unusual place with respect to its high level of external educational aid in comparison to local funding and investment in education, as shown in Table 5. It is not an exaggeration to say that external educational aid dominates the outlook and influences the direction of education in RMI more than it does in other Pacific states.

Compared to what it gets from the U.S., RMI receives a relatively small amount of educational assistance from all other donor countries and agencies combined – UNESCO, the EU, the ADB, Taiwan, Australia, and Japan.

Figure 10 shows the origin of all external aid to RMI, including aid coming to the MOE and assistance to NGOs and private schools in RMI. In 2002, more than $10 million or 81% of external aid to education in RMI came from the U.S. The ADB, Taiwan, and other external funding sources (Japan, AusAid, UNESCO) make up less than 10% each.

FIGURE 10 External Educational Aid to RMI, 2002-2003

Source: Data are from Draft Portfolio Budget Statements, 2003-2004. The Ministry of Education Portfolio, by Ministry of Education 2003, Majuro, Republic of the Marshall Islands: Author. Adapted with permission.

Although external aid is unstable, the dependence on it for education is pervasive. RMI takes for granted that outside sources of money will be there to assist with the basic task of providing education. As it now exists, the RMI educational system would collapse if the flow of external funding assistance stopped. In other words, the education system is not sustainable. Furthermore, the direction of education is intimately tied to aid sources and their mandates, rather than Marshallese vision and goals.

What follows is a discussion on each of the donor countries and agencies currently operating in RMI.

U.S. Federal Grants

According to the U.S. GAO (2000b), more than $31.9 million worth of grants and indirect assistance was provided to RMI by the U.S. Department of Education during FYs 1987-1999 (pp. 37-39). Table 7 provides a detailed picture of types of U.S. federal monies, purposes, and target clients.

The dominance of U.S. funding for education is likely to continue through the Compact II period of 2003-2023. As proposed in Compact II, the level of U.S. contribution toward education is expected to increase another 10-15% since education is one of the priority areas. However, there is some concern that U.S. federal programs’ eligibility, provided through separate congressional legislation during Compact I years, may not be extended during the Compact II period.

Although supplementary in nature, U.S. federal grants assist all levels of education in RMI – from preschool to postsecondary education. In some cases, outside educational aid represents the only budget allocation for a given sector. Local sources for the Head Start program, for example, have not been earmarked to fund preschool education. If these funds are eliminated in 2004, the entire preschool program would be forced to close down, impacting more than 100 staff serving 1,023 students. Preschool education, as it currently exists in RMI, is a mandate only of the U.S. federal government. With better information about research on the value of school readiness, the MOE is attempting to make kindergarten education compulsory. This attempt has yet to be fully embraced by the government. Consequently, the MOE can only implement kindergarten in 10 schools every year as space and staff are available.

U.S. federal programs are guided by different policies and directions that are generally not those envisioned by Marshallese educators. As noted in Table 7, these programs start and stop based on dictates of Congress, the agenda of each new administration, and the needs of the U.S. Grants are often discontinued even when the need for them is still great. In some cases, a grant program might not be needed, but when the eligibility is somehow extended to the FAS, education departments manage to find the need for it. This disconnect between what RMI needs and available funds still dominates.

As shown in Table 8, in FY 2002-2003, the final year of Compact I, 36% of the MOE revenues came from local sources, while 63% came from external sources – 55% from U.S. grants assistance (U.S. federal grants and U.S. Compact funds) and 8% from other external sources. The proposed budget for 2003 shows an impressive increase for the U.S. share of the MOE budget from Compact and grant funds, while the local contribution takes a noteworthy dive. This bears watching, as a good portion of the U.S. contribution in 2003 is in the form of federal grants assistance, much of which might not be reauthorized for continued funding under Compact II.

A challenge will be in ensuring that increased Compact II funds for education do not mean decreased local revenues dedicated to education. The 2003 budget illustrates such a case. While Compact II allocations for education are proposed to double in 2003, local revenue shares are proposed to decrease to only 10% of the education budget, down from 36% in 2002. That is equivalent to only 3.5% of total RMI domestic revenues, which make up the RMI General Fund. Comments from interviewees in this study follow:

Federal programs force the MOE to rely too much on the U.S. system of education.

Educational aid should be complimentary, not the main source of educational funding. Funding from the U.S. is so pervasive that it is hard to make “our” education ours – something that is reflective of our values and beliefs.

There is not enough time and no think tank type of group to help with an analysis of policies entailed in a given grant or to forecast the impact from obtaining and implementing a certain type of grant.

TABLE 7
U.S. Federal Educational Aid to RMI, 2001-2003

Source: Data are from The Compact of Free Association Title II Economic Assistance Provision: A New Standard of Economic Development and Fiscal Stability for the Republic of the Marshall Islands, by Compact Negotiation Office, 2003, Majuro, Republic of the Marshall Islands: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands. Adapted with permission. Data are also from The Portfolio Budget Statements 2003-2004: Budget Initiatives and Explanations of Appropriation Specified by Outcomes & Outputs by Agency, by Ministry of Education, 2003, Majuro, Republic of the Marshall Islands: Author. Adapted with permission.

Notes: * Pending reauthorization of IDEA legislation

** U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

TABLE 8
Percentage of MOE Budget by Sources, 2001-2004